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 Malawi, a small, land-locked country in south Eastern 
Africa has been at the forefront of the recent push to 
reestablish subsidies as a way of boosting agricultural 
production and improving food security, especially among 
the poor. Its programs have been widely observed, 
scrutinized, and emulated. This policy brief examines 
Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) and distills a 
set of key research findings drawn from research conducted 
recently at Purdue University.  
 
 
Introduction:  Agricultural Subsidies in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
 Agricultural subsidies are used in many countries to 
support farmers and promote specific agricultural practices. 
They tend to be costly, and for this reason they justify close 
scrutiny, especially in developing countries, where there are 
numerous competing demands for scarce public resources. 
Agricultural input subsidies were a major component of 
agricultural development strategies in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) in the 1970s and 1980s. They were then largely 
phased out in response to World Bank and IMF imposed 
structural adjustment programs in the 1990s. In recent 
years, large-scale input subsidy programs have re-emerged 
across the continent, and their reintroduction gained 
particular momentum following the first African Fertilizer 
Summit, which was held in Nigeria in 2006. Today, seven 
African governments alone spend roughly US$2.0 billion on 
fertilizer promotion programs each year. These subsidies 
constitute a substantial share of public spending on 
agriculture in these countries. One justification for the re-
introduction of large input subsidy programs has been the 
belief that past mistakes in administering these programs 
have been identified and can be corrected. The approaches 
taken in the 1970s and 1980s tended to rely on universal 
coverage, which was costly and spread benefits beyond 
target groups. In contrast, current efforts have been 
rebranded as “smart subsidies” because they are said to 
rely on new institutions and improved implementation 
strategies that can encourage private sector development 
and more accurately target intended beneficiaries. 
Arguments over the relative merits of fertilizer subsidy 
programs constitute one of the most contentious policy 
debates  currently  taking  place  in Africa. Much is at  stake,  
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including smallholder livelihoods and government 
budgets. 
 
Agricultural Subsidies in Malawi 
 
 The use of input subsidies in Malawi dates to 
the early seventies.  Not only was the use of 
agricultural subsidies perceived as successful in 
stimulating food crop production, subsidies 
enabled the country to achieve a high degree of 
self-reliance in maize, Malawi’s main staple. The 
use of subsidies was eliminated in the early 1990’s 
as part of a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) 
that was adopted to deregulate Malawi’s markets. 
Agricultural subsidies were reintroduced in 1998 
under a program called the Starter Pack Scheme 
(SPS). The SPS provided small quantities of seed 
and fertilizer to nearly all farmers in the country. 
The SPS eventually evolved into a Targeted Inputs 
Program (TIP). Under the program, all households 
were entitled to a package containing sufficient 
fertilizer and seed to plant about 0.1 hectare of 
maize. Although this was not a large subsidy, for 
food insecure households it was a substantial 
intervention. 
 	   Bad weather in the 2004/05 agricultural season 
led to very low national production and a severe 
food crisis in 2005. In response, government 
reorientated its food security program and scaled 
down the TIP. The ongoing food crisis prompted 
the government to re-introduce large scale input 
subsidies for maize and tobacco under a program 
called the Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP). 
The program was implemented with the objective 
to increase smallholder farmers’ access to 
improved agricultural inputs as a way of achieving 
food self-sufficiency and increasing farm incomes. 
The program transfers paper vouchers to selected 
households, which enables them to purchase 
fertilizer, hybrid seed and/or pesticides at greatly 
reduced prices. 
 
FISP Eligibility and Implementation  
 
 The FISP was first implemented in 2005. 
During the first two years of the program, 
guidelines for identifying beneficiaries were not 
clear.  Targeting was decentralized, and village 
leaders and village distribution committees had 
wide latitude in deciding who was eligible to 
receive the voucher. At the start of the 2007/08 
agricultural season, clearer guidelines and criteria 
were established both for eligibility and selection. 
Priority was placed on emphasizing vulnerable 
households as program beneficiaries. Additional 
changes were made for the 2008/09 growing 
season. Pesticides for postharvest grain storage 
were introduced and vouchers were made more 
secure to prevent fraud, and voucher resale, two 
commonly recognized and ongoing problems 
during previous seasons. For the 2009 subsidy 
program each targeted household was entitled to 
100kg of maize fertilizer at nearly a 90% 
subsidized price and either 2kg of free hybrid 
maize seed or 4kg of open pollinated maize. Some 
households were also entitled coupons for tobacco 
fertilizer allowing access to 50kg of chemical 
fertilizer and some subsidies were also provided 
for cotton growers. The following official criteria 
were clearly stated as those to be used to select 
beneficiaries in the 2007/08 and 2008/09 
agricultural seasons: 
 
(1) Recipients had to be Malawians who 
owned a piece of land that was being 
cultivated; 
(2) Recipients had to be farmers that were 
bona fide residents of their villages; 
(3) Only one recipient was eligible per 
household; and 
(4) Priority was to be given to vulnerable 
groups, especially households that were 
either child- or female-headed. 
 
Understanding the Impacts of the 2009 
FISP 
 
 How well did the FISP perform and for whom? 
To answer this question we engaged in extensive 
and complementary fieldwork in Malawi in 2009 
using several stages of data collection and 
analysis to study smallholder farmers’ behaviors, 
their decisions and outcomes on their farms. 
 
 In one study, we conducted detailed interviews 
with 380 farm households in 35 villages in 
Kasungu and Machinga districts. As part of the 
study design we explicitly included in our survey 
households that had been part of prior studies 
conducted in 2002 and 2006 to understand how 
conditions and behaviors had changed in response 
to the program. Our collaborators included 
researchers at Bunda College at the University of 
Malawi.  The districts studied possess diverse 
demographic, climatic and socioeconomic
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conditions, but agriculture is the main occupation 
at both locations. Data were collected on a wide 
range of household and village characteristics such 
as crop production and input use, incomes and 
expenditures, and participation in the input subsidy 
program.  The goal of data collection was to study: 
(i) receipt of subsidies; (ii) use of fertilizer; (iii) 
maize production; and (iv) patterns of agricultural 
land use. 
 
 The second study relied on a nationally 
representative sample of farm households in 13 
districts across Malawi.  Data were collected as 
part of a collaboration between Michigan State 
University, University of London School of Oriental 
and Asian Studies, and University of Malawi 
Chancellor College.  The data set built on earlier 
rounds of data collected in 2003 and 2007.  In total 
1,375 households were interviewed.  The goal of 
this research was to study: (i) receipt of subsidies; 
(ii) the extent to which the subsidy program 
affected private fertilizer markets; and (iii) maize 
production. 
 
Participation In and Fertilizer Use Impacts 
of the FISP 
 
Who actually received the coupons? 
 
 The initial design of the subsidy program was 
to have each deserving household receive two 
fertilizer coupons (one each for 50 kg of basal 
fertilizer and 50 kg of side dressing fertilizer) and a 
coupon for maize seed (2 kg hybrid or 4 kg Open 
Pollinated Varieties). However, program limitations, 
regional differences and local idiosyncrasies 
resulted in households receiving different packet 
sizes sometimes ranging from nothing to more 
than twice the recommended amount. 
 
 Overall, both studies found that even though 
targeting was decentralized and conducted at a 
local level, it was not very precise, and did not 
align well with official program goals.  Study results 
suggest that older households were more likely to 
have received a complete input subsidy packet 
than younger households. Contrary to program 
requirements, female headed households were 
less likely than male headed households to have 
received a complete package of coupons. Being 
educated increased the likelihood of receiving 
more coupons than the recommended amount. It is 
likely that being educated possibly enhanced 
bargaining power with those who played a role in 
identifying beneficiary households. Despite 
targeting criteria to the contrary, poor households 
were most likely to have received nothing. 
 
 Social factors played an important role in 
determining a household’s probability of receiving 
a subsidy voucher. Household heads that had lived 
in their villages for longer periods had an increased 
probability of receiving coupons for 100 kg of 
fertilizer (the recommended amount) or more. The 
length of residency was influential in creating ties 
with the village head and members of the Village 
Development Committee, all of whom were 
responsible for selecting subsidy beneficiaries. 
Results also indicated important district-level 
differences in program implementation.  
 
How did coupon receipt affect fertilizer use? 
 
 Having identified who actually received the 
coupons, the question of interest was to assess the 
effect of coupon receipt on chemical fertilizer use. 
In particular, what were the effects on the 
quantities of fertilizer applied to hybrid and 
traditional varieties? An important objective of the 
coupon/voucher system, albeit temporary, was to 
stimulate the use of improved maize seed and 
fertilizer among poor farmers and consequently 
empower them to purchase their own inputs for 
subsequent growing seasons. Our analysis took 
into account the fertilizer-maize price ratio, 
household socio demographic and economic 
characteristics, farmers’ participation in the 
fertilizer subsidy program, economic shocks 
(shocks resulting in labor, financial and physical 
crop loss) encountered before and/or during the 
2008/09 agricultural season, market access and 
whether or not a household used improved maize 
seed. 
 
 Results suggest that while larger farms used 
more fertilizer for maize production overall, small 
farms were more intensive in their use of fertilizer 
than large farms, providing greater returns to each 
unit of fertilizer applied. Female-headed 
households used less fertilizer for maize than did 
their male counterparts. Chemical fertilizer use was 
also correlated with the overall level of wealth of a 
household: poor households used less fertilizer on 
their plots. Such households generally tended to 
have low levels of income and were also less likely 
to have received subsidies. 
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 Farmers that planted improved varieties of 
maize used approximately 50 kg more fertilizer 
than those that did not.  This is probably indicative 
of patterns in adoption behavior where farmers 
adopt improved maize production technologies as 
a package. Households that were classified as net 
buyers of maize used less fertilizer suggesting 
competition for cash between immediate 
consumption and purchase of fertilizer. 
 
 The various forms of vouchers received led to 
mixed outcomes with regard to fertilizer use. 
Households that received two coupons (for 100 kg 
of fertilizer) used 178 kg more fertilizer on average 
than those that did not receive a coupon.  
Uncertainty surrounding the future of the program 
led some households to save fertilizer for future 
use. In general the FISP increased fertilizer use 
among beneficiaries, but by an amount somewhat 
less than the total quantity of fertilizer subsidized. 
 
Did the program “crowd-out” the private 
sector? 
 
 The FISP’s effectiveness in targeting recipient 
farmers who met certain criteria had a direct effect 
on how the program impacted demand for 
commercial fertilizer. In principle, if subsidized 
fertilizer was allocated to farmers who would not 
have otherwise purchased fertilizer commercially, 
then a one ton increase in total fertilizer use would 
be observed for each ton of fertilizer distributed 
under the program. With other factors constant, 
such a pattern would maximize the contribution of 
a subsidy program to farm income and national 
food production.  In contrast, if some of the 
fertilizer received in subsidized form would have 
been purchased even in the absence of the FISP, 
but was not, then the program can be said to have 
“crowded-out” the private sector. Measuring the 
degree to which fertilizer subsidies crowd out 
commercial sales is essential for understanding the 
contribution of the fertilizer subsidy program to total 
fertilizer use and, ultimately, the overall net impact 
on food production and farm incomes. 
 
 We estimate that the rate of crowding-out was 
22%.  This means that, on average, each kilogram 
of subsidized fertilizer crowded-out 0.22 kilograms 
of commercial fertilizer.  Another way to look at this 
finding is that 100 kilograms of subsidized fertilizer 
added only 78 new kilograms to total fertilizer use, 
because 22 of those kilograms represent 
commercial purchases that were displaced.  We 
also found, not surprisingly, that relatively better-off 
farmers were more likely than poor farmers to 
crowd-out their commercial purchases. For 
example, we found that the crowding out rate for 
the poorest fifth of our sample was 18%, compared 
with a crowding-out rate of 30% for the wealthiest 
fifth of the sample.  This result is logical because 
wealthier households were more likely to have had 
the resources to purchase fertilizer on the 
commercial market.  To reduce crowding out and 
thereby maximize increases in total fertilizer use, it 
makes sense therefore to target households that 
are not participating in the commercial fertilizer 
market. 
 
How did fertilizer use affect maize yields? 
 
 The subsidy program appears to have 
increased total fertilizer use for maize but what 
were its impacts on maize yields? To answer this 
question we measured the statistical relationship 
between fertilizer inputs and maize yields. The 
results indicate a significant and positive 
correlation between the amount of fertilizer used 
and yield. At higher rates of fertilizer use, however, 
the relationship between the amount of fertilizer 
used and the total yield exhibits declining returns to 
fertilizer use. Plots planted with improved maize on 
average produced higher yields (approximately 
1400 kg/hectare) compared to those planted with 
traditional maize (approximately 1050 kg/hectare). 
Figure 1 shows the graphical relationship between 
fertilizer application and maize yield in Malawi, and 
can be used to understand how the subsidy 
program affected production on smallholder farms. 
The figure was generated using data collected on 
the 380 farms in our 2009 survey and represent 
“average” patterns observed in the data. The 
horizontal axis in the figure measures the 
fertilization rate on a farm (in kg/acre) and the 
vertical axis measures the amount of maize 
produced (in kg/acre). Two lines are plotted in the 
figure. The solid line represents the average 
physical relationship between fertilizer input and 
maize output when a traditional variety of maize 
was planted. The dashed line represents the 
average relationship between fertilizer and output 
when an improved (hybrid or open-pollinated) 
variety of maize was planted. The difference 
between these curves can be interpreted as the 
gain in output associated with using improved 
seeds, at any given level of fertilizer application.
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 Four key representative points are marked in 
the figure. These are labeled t0, t1, h0 and h1. 
Points t0 (traditional maize) and h0 (hybrid maize) 
represent yields at average fertilization rates 
observed for farmers who did not receive 
subsidized fertilizer. Points t1 (traditional) and h1 
(hybrid) represent maize yields at mean fertilization 
rates for farmers who used subsidized fertilizer. 
The points illustrate how the input subsidy program 
moved traditional maize producers from a point like 
t0 on the production function (low inputs with 
traditional seeds) to a point like t1 (higher inputs 
with the same traditional seeds). Similarly, on 
average farmers using improved maize seeds who 
received subsidized fertilizer moved from a point 
like h0 to a point like h1 (higher inputs with 
improved seeds). The total effect of access to a 
complete packet of coupons (consisting of both 
improved seed and fertilizer) was to shift 
production from a point like t0 (low inputs with 
traditional seeds) to a point like h1 (higher inputs 
with improved seeds). Our results indicate that, of 
the average gain in maize yield associated with 
this movement, about 40% of the gain came from 
accessing fertilizer and about 60% of the gain 
came from accessing improved seed. Including 
improved maize seed in the FISP boosted benefits 
of the program because yields from improved 
maize are higher at each level of fertilization than 
yields from traditional maize.  Providing improved 
seed was therefore a key component in the 
subsidy program. 
 
Land Use Effects of the FISP 
 
 Given enhanced incentives to produce maize, 
did farmers alter their planting decisions? 
Increasing maize production was one of the 
subsidy’s program goals. An important outcome of 
the FISP has been an increase in maize production 
through higher yields. But we also observe that 
maize output increased due to an increase in the 
amount of land planted to maize. The subsidy 
program affected land use by increasing the 
allocation of land to maize in households that 
received a complete packet of coupons compared 
to those households that did not.  Overall, we 
found that each complete set of subsidy coupons 
received by farmers was associated with a 16% 
increase in the area that farmers allocated to 
maize during the 2008/09 agricultural season. 
Combining this finding with results from the 
production analysis indicates that the total direct 
impact of receiving a full seed and fertilizer subsidy 
consisted of two parts: an increase in area planted 
and an increase in yield on that area. The average 
amount of land planted to maize in our sample was 
0.88 hectares. The average farm-level impact on 
maize production, accounting for both yield and 
area changes, was approximately 500 kg for each 
complete set of coupons (seed and fertilizer). We 
note, however, that output from other crops 
declined as a result of a shift toward maize. 
Farmers who received vouchers for seed and 
fertilizer allocated less land to other crops than 
those who did not receive vouchers. Valuing this 
reduced crop area based on average areas and 
yields for the most closely-competing crop 
(cassava), and using the prevailing farm gate price 
of cassava and retail price of maize, we calculate 
that the maize-equivalent value of offset production 
was roughly 250 kg of maize, on average, or about 
half of the observed gain.  This means that the 
overall net effect of the subsidy program was to 
increase maize output by about 250 kg per 
beneficiary household per year.  
 
Effects of the FISP on Forest Clearing 
 
 One additional objective of our research was to 
assess whether the subsidy program, which was 
targeted at maize and tobacco farmers, had any 
effect on farmers’ decisions to clear forests for 
agricultural expansion, which has been a problem 
in Malawi, as elsewhere. We found that maize 
subsidies reduced agricultural expansion modestly. 
The FISP probably helped to lessen pressure on 




 Input subsidies are currently receiving a great 
deal of attention as a potentially sustainable 
strategy for boosting productivity and increasing 
food security for small farmers in Africa.  Malawi’s 
Farm Input Support Program (FISP), which targets 
a subset of farm households, is seen by many as 
“proof of concept” for broader implementation 
across Africa.  This policy brief has summarized 
research conducted at Purdue that estimates the 
impacts of Malawi’s FISP.   
 
 The main findings are as follows: 
 
1) Malawi’s decentralized targeting system had 
trouble reaching resource-poor farmers.
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• Contrary to program requirements, female-
headed households were less likely than 
male-headed households to have received 
a complete package of coupons. 
• Being educated increased the likelihood of 
receiving more coupons than the 
recommended amount. 
• Social connections mattered:  households 
whose heads had resided in the village for 
longer periods had higher probabilities of 
receiving subsidized fertilizer. 
 
2) The subsidy program increased fertilizer use 
intensity in terms of kilograms of fertilizer 
applied per hectare. 
• Small farms had higher fertilizer use 
intensities, on average. 
• Female-headed households had lower 
fertilizer use intensities, on average. 
 
3) The subsidy program reduced household 
demand for fertilizer purchased on the 
commercial market (the “crowding out” effect). 
• On average, 100 kg of subsidized fertilizer 
crowded out 22 kg of fertilizer purchased on 
the commercial market. 
• The crowding out rate was smallest (18%) 
for the poorest fifth of households, and 
largest (30%) for the wealthiest fifth of 
households. 
 
4) Although costly, Malawi’s subsidy program 
produced some modest gains in maize yields. 
• Acquiring subsidized seed and fertilizer 
increased average yields by about 500 
kg/ha.   
• Improved seeds were an essential 
component of the program.  Programs 
should not overlook the value of providing 
farmers with improved seeds. 
 
5) While the subsidy produced some yield gains, it 
also altered farmer’s planting decisions and 
lead to increases in area planted to maize at 
the expense of other crops.   
• The maize-equivalent value of offset 
production was roughly 250 kg of maize, on 
average, roughly equivalent to half of the 
observed gain in maize output. 
• Such changes could have implications for 
household nutrition, for example if 
displaced crops (such as legumes and 
tubers) are nutritionally superior to maize.    
 
6) There is also some evidence to suggest that 
the input subsidy program may have relieved 
pressure on forests by intensifying maize 
production. 
 
We conclude with the following policy 
recommendations for improving the delivery 
and effectiveness of input subsidy programs. 
 
I) Governments need to establish clear targeting 
guidelines and stronger monitoring and 
evaluation procedures for subsidy programs.  
This will help resource poor farmers obtain 
greater access to subsidized inputs.  Our 
results suggest that when resource poor 
farmers acquire subsidized fertilizer, they 
increase fertilizer use intensity.  In addition, the 
overall rate of commercial crowding out can be 
reduced when poorer households are targeted, 
which maximizes the subsidy’s contribution to 
total fertilizer use. 
II) Subsidies can increase maize yields, but the 
programs are costly and, in purely value terms, 
provide a relatively low return to public 
expenditure.  Providing improved seeds is an 
essential component of the policy mix. 
Providing farmers with improved seeds may be 
a more cost-effective way to boost yields than 
simply boosting fertilizer use. To some degree, 
increases in maize output occur at the expense 
of other important crops such as legumes and 
tubers.  Subsidizing legume seed would be a 
way to prevent maize from completely 
dominating agricultural response.  Planting 
legumes provides nutritional benefits to 
households.  Legumes also return nitrogen to 
the soil, which can lessen the need for 
chemical inputs and further reduce the need to 
subsidize fertilizer. 
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